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Summary 
 
Overview 
For those concerned with job quality in the United States, the retail industry commands attention.  
Retail is not only the largest low-wage industry in the country’s economy; it is the largest 
industry, period. It generates numerous entry level jobs for those with limited formal training.  
Hourly wages of nonsupervisory workers in retail languish at about three-quarters the national 
average.  Retail is a very important employer of young workers.  Its workforce is also 
disproportionately female.  Women are concentrated in particular retail sub-sectors and some 
minority groups seem to remain employed in retail over time.  At the same time, retail jobs—at 
least, those involving direct interaction with consumers—are geographically anchored, offering a 
potential leverage point for policies to improve job quality. 
 
We place retailers’ business strategies at the center of our analysis and trace the connections 
between corporate strategy and job quality. We focus on three main dimensions of job quality:  
compensation; schedule and its impact on the work-life nexus; and hiring and promotion 
opportunities. We examine the composition of the workforce in retail jobs and the likely 
implications of changes in job quality for the workforce.  We use descriptive statistics from the 
Current Population Survey and draw on a unique set of retail case studies of food and consumer 
electronics retailers we conducted during 2005-07.  We focus on frontline jobs: cashiers, clerks, 
and baggers positions.   
 
Demographics 
Young workers—those under 25 and even under 18—are over-represented in retail.  Women are 
over-represented in frontline retail jobs relative to their share of the total employed workforce, 
but are under-represented in management jobs.  Black, Latino, and foreign workers are not 
particularly over-represented in frontline jobs in the sector, and are under-represented in 
management, with some exceptions. 
Company strategies 
Company strategies aimed at addressing competition from big-box retailers in a saturated retail 
market consist of two concurrent strategies:  cutting labor costs and increasing service levels.  
These responses have had implications for job quality.   
Schedules and the part-time/full-time distinction 
Work schedules have become the primary managerial lever for cost control.  The industry has 
long made heavy use of part-time work; the rate of part-time is 28% in retail (41% in frontline 
jobs) as compared to 19 % economy-wide.  With long opening hours, pressure has grown on 
entry-level and other staff to work one weekend day and evening hours.  In their drive to control 
costs, stores use hours as shock absorbers “flexing” relatively short guaranteed hours for full-
timers (around 32-35 hours) and part-time schedules up to 40 hours on a week by week basis.  
The predictability of earnings and control over one’s schedule are significantly affected by this 
practice and have dire implications for workers with care responsibilities. 
 
For most aspects of job quality, the greatest divide in retail is between full-time and part-time; 
part-time is an employment status as well as a schedule. All entry-level hiring is part-time.  
There is a wage disparity between part-time and full-time front line jobs as well as exclusion 
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from employer sponsored benefits for part-time workers in many cases.  Women are over-
represented in part-time work; so are Black, Latino and foreign-born workers.  This is 
particularly true for blacks in frontline electronics jobs. 
Compensation 
Implications of part-time status are clear.  Part-timers earn 33 percent less than full-timers (and 
68 percent less on a weekly basis)—a disadvantage markedly exceeding that of part-timers 
economy-wide (23 percent).  Remarkably, the gap is widest of all among frontline workers in 
electronics retail, who earn 55 percent less than their full-time colleagues. 
 
Many retail workers stand to benefit from the relatively modest increases in the minimum wage 
adopted by Congress. Using the nominal value of the federal minimum wage as of July 2008 
($6.55) as a yardstick, 1-in-12 retail workers are below the benchmark in 2007, as do 1-in-5 part-
time, frontline retail workers while only 1-in-19 private sector workers are below this 
benchmark. 
 
Additionally, our field work indicates that wage progression is less steep than in the past, so that 
the rewards to seniority and experience have decreased, making the jobs less desirable. 
 
Health insurance coverage is lower in retail jobs than economy-side (44% versus 53%).  
Furthermore, only 17% of part-timers get health insurance through their employer.  Worker 
experience varies considerably; part-timers in consumer electronics are only 10% as likely as 
full-timers to get insurance, while those in grocery stores are 29% as likely.  Importantly, with 
rising health costs, health benefits have been pared down for all workers in recent years although 
there is a small counter trend with some retailers that have begun offer bare bone coverage to 
their many part-timers.  The amount of paid time off (sick, vacation, personal time) is also under 
pressure in many retailers.  The reduced compensation and benefits make the jobs less viable for 
heads of households 
Training, turnover, mobility and duties 
We examined the closely linked issues of training, turnover, mobility, and duties. Turnover 
stemming from employee quits is high in food retail and industry-wide; it ranged from 40 to 86% 
in all but one company in our study.  It is much higher for part-time than full-time workers.  
Managers quickly identify and groom supervisory/management prospects while managing a high 
turnover, mostly part-time, workforce.  The combined strategies of cutting labor costs and 
increasing service levels have created added pressures from greater variety of duties and 
increased need for monitoring, particularly for full-time workers and supervisors who must make 
up for the turnover, lack of training, and low commitment of many part-timers who do not expect 
to stay in the industry. 
 
Retail has historically promoted from within and continues to do so for a greater degree than 
other industries.  While we did not use longitudinal data, we examined who has gotten promoted 
by looking at the composition of supervisor and managerial jobs in retail as compared to the 
economy as a whole.  (This comparison takes as a benchmark the odds of promotion of particular 
groups in the economy as a whole, which of course are skewed as well.)  The odds of 
advancement appear to be tilted against women in retail as whole, and more so in consumer 
electronics than in grocery stores.  Blacks are slightly under-represented in managerial jobs in 
retail overall, severely under-represented among consumer electronics managers and slightly 
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over-represented among grocery store managers.  Latinos are represented in managerial jobs in 
retail to the same degree they are economy-wide but under-represented among consumer 
electronics and grocery store managers.  In field work, we observed changes in recruiting and 
promotion practices that have mixed consequences for workers seeking advancement in retail.  In 
both food and electronics retail, there is a move toward recruiting or promoting college graduates 
for store managers, a trend which will work against those without degrees.  A related pattern is 
the move toward recruiting from the outside (particularly in electronics.) This latter shift may 
have beneficial effects for workers who reach assistant manager and store manager ranks.  It may 
increase prospects for career advancement because candidates have opportunities for lateral 
mobility across parts of retail and from other fields into retail. 
Policy and organizing responses, and needed research 
We examine the areas for policy action and organizing that will have greatest impact on job 
quality for retail workers, particularly given that retail is a locally-bound industry.   
 Regarding compensation, increases in the minimum wage can affect large numbers of retail 
front line workers.  Changing procedures for unionization and linking development 
agreements to employer neutrality in union drives will matter.  Innovative union organizing 
and bargaining approaches, region-wide for the sector, hold the potential for effectiveness 
against large retailers in particular.  Mandating pay parity for part-timers will bring the US 
situation in line with that of the European Union.   
 Regarding schedules, reducing store opening hours will provide relief to both workers and 
managers.   
 Regarding promotion equity, a number of approaches to equalizing screening tests, and a mix 
of incentives and monitoring approaches will have impact because the supervisory and 
managerial ranks are still filled from within to a large extent.  Improving scheduling options 
will, by itself, go a long way toward facilitating promotion for women and others with care 
responsibilities as well as facilitate recruitment.   
 
For many of these approaches, we expect community groups or associations can be a means to 
trigger public attention and information, to sustain the calls for action, and to monitor 
implementation.  Policy by itself would remain dead letter otherwise because conventional 
means of enforcement, such as inspections, perform poorly in a setting with numerous, scattered, 
worksites, such as retail. 
 
We identify several areas for future research to inform policy action and advocacy:   
1) Case based research links corporate market strategies, employment practices, labor supply, 
and job quality; it will help inform options for advocacy and policy action.   
2) Assessment of the transferability of successful models from other sectors to retail is needed.   
3) Cross-national comparative research can shed light on new options for job quality 
improvements.  
4) Building the knowledge base on channels and barriers to mobility in retail and other low-
wage industries will help identify how policy action or advocacy can improve mobility. 
 
The good news is that retail consolidation creates a new set of leverage points on which carefully 
targeted policy and organizing can potentially exert extremely broad impacts.  Continued 
research and experimentation to locate and act on these leverage points holds out the promise of 
turning the industry that is America’s bad job leader into an example of how to convert bad jobs 
into good ones. 
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I. Introduction 
 
For those concerned with job quality in the United States, the retail industry commands attention.  
Retail is not only the largest low-wage industry in the country’s economy; it is the largest 
industry, period.  The retail workforce includes about one US worker in seven, slightly more than 
manufacturing; Wal-Mart is the nation’s largest private employer.  Hourly wages of 
nonsupervisory workers in retail languish at about three-quarters the national average.  Retail is a 
very important employer of young workers.  Its workforce is also disproportionately female; 
although the over-representation of women in retail overall is slight, women are concentrated in 
particular retail sub-sectors.  At the same time, retail jobs—at least, those involving direct 
interaction with consumers—are geographically anchored, offering a potential leverage point for 
policies to improve job quality. 
 
What’s more, this is a critical time to understand what’s happening with jobs in retail.  The last 
twenty years have seen enormous consolidation of the industry, through mergers and acquisitions 
as well as the rapid expansion of big-box upstarts such as Wal-Mart, Target, Home Depot, and 
Best Buy.  In terms of technology, the bar-code revolution of the 1980s paved the way for 
advanced logistical systems that have transformed the sector, not least by constituting a key 
building block of big-box success. 
 
In this paper, we place retailers’ business strategies at the center of the analysis.  Retailers choose 
their competitive strategies, including human resource strategies, in interaction with market 
dynamics as well as with the characteristics and desires of the available workforce.  Wherever 
possible, we trace the connections between corporate strategy and job quality. 
 
We focus on three main dimensions of job quality: 
• Compensation, including benefits, and with attention to both average level and inequality 
in compensation 
• Schedule and its impact on the work-life nexus 
• Hiring and promotion opportunities—again, including both typical patterns and the 
distribution of opportunities.   
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Our analysis draws on two main data sources.  First, we include descriptive statistics from the 
Current Population Survey.  Second, we draw on a unique set of retail case studies of food and 
consumer electronics retailers we conducted during 2005-07.  These two sub-sectors were 
selected because of their gender and pay contrast:  food retail is dominated by women workers 
and pay is low while consumer electronics retail has a prevalence of male workers and pay is 
relatively high (see Compensation section). The sample of regional and national chains included 
ten food retailers, six electronics retailers, and two companies that sell both food and electronic 
goods.  In total, 195 interviews were conducted.  They include interviews with headquarter 
managers for human resources and operations, with regional managers, with store managers and 
with a sample of frontline workers—part-time and full-time, front end and sales floor workers as 
well as those in specialized departments (e.g. bakery, deli, copying, and home entertainment).  
We also interviewed union representatives at one unionized and one partly unionized chain 
(union officials at a third unionized company declined to be interviewed).1
II. Who has the frontline jobs in retail 
 
 
In the rest of the paper, we first describe who holds frontline retail jobs, and then briefly outline 
the chief competitive strategies in retail.  By “frontline” jobs in retail, we men cashier, clerk, and 
bagger jobs. In the largest section of the paper, we review our three dimensions of job quality—
schedule, compensation, and mobility (incorporating some discussion of duties in this last, since 
mobility involves shifts in duties)—and describe how the main corporate strategies affect them.  
We close with discussion of major policy options for improving retail jobs, some of which are 
also relevant for improving low wage jobs in other sectors. 
 
 
The hiring process at the large retail companies we visited is (1) applicants fill out an 
application, increasingly online with an initial screening test focusing on honesty and work ethic; 
and (2) managers conduct one or more face-to-face interview.  The other implicit element in 
screening is the very high level of turnover in the first few weeks on the job.  Despite very 
limited skill requirements for entry-level jobs, who ends up in the job is far from a representative 
sample of workers with limited skills, both because of who applies and presumably because of 
                                               
1 For details, see Carré and Tilly with Holgate 2007. 
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biases built into the online screening, interviewing, and “survival” through the probationary 
period (Moss and Tilly 2001). 
 
As Figure 1 shows, young workers—those under 25 and even those under 18—are heavily over-
represented in retail jobs, with the youngest workers particularly common in grocery stores, and 
the 18-24 group most concentrated in consumer electronics.  (As noted, we focus on the 
“frontline” jobs of cashier, clerk, and bagger.)  Interestingly, over-65 workers are also over-
represented in retail, although they are scarce in electronics stores.  Both young workers 
(especially current students) and older workers represent reliable sources of willing part-time 
workers, a critical element in retail’s labor strategy. 
 
Figure 1: Age distribution of employees in 2007, by sector 
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14%14%
24%
32%
43%
31%
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39%
32%
37%
29%
34%
28%
24%
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<18 18-24 25-44 45-64 >65
 
Source: Authors’ calculations from March 2007 Current Population Survey.  Universe is all 
privately employed wage and salary workers.  Frontline jobs include cashiers, clerks, and 
baggers. 
 
Also, retail, particularly grocery stores, disproportionately employs people with less than a high 
school education (Figure 2).  If we net out the percentage under 18, only grocery store frontline 
jobs have higher-than-average proportion of persons without a high school degree (not shown).  
Consumer electronics frontline jobs, at the other extreme, have a particularly low proportion of 
less-educated people, particularly after netting out under-18 employees. 
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Figure 2: Percentage of employees with less than a high school education by sector, 2007 
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Source: See Figure 1. 
 
As shown in Figure 3, retail is disproportionately female, but only slightly so.  The percentage 
increases as we focus only on frontline employees, signaling that women are over-represented in 
retail frontline jobs but under-represented in management jobs (Carré, Holgate, and Tilly 2006; 
see Figure 6 below).  In consumer electronics, to the contrary, women are relatively few even in 
cashier and clerk jobs. 
 
The employment patterns for women with children under 18 and under 6 are quite remarkable.  
Given retail’s reliance on part-time jobs, one might have expected women with young children to 
be concentrated in retail’s front lines.  But as Figure 3 shows, they are not.  Though, as we will 
see, women in retail are concentrated in part-time jobs, it is not because of over-representation of 
women caring for children. 
 
Blacks and Latinos are under-represented in retail jobs (Figure 4).  The proportions do rise when 
we limit our attention to frontline jobs, and again when we focus on grocery frontline jobs (and 
electronics in the case of blacks, but not Latinos).  However, these are not jobs with particularly 
high proportions of black and Latino workers.  For frontline jobs, retailers often draw upon their 
local labor market, often the vicinity of each store (and recruit a workforce that “mirrors” the 
customer composition in terms of ethnicity); to some extent the under-representation of Blacks 
and Latinos may also reflect the location of supermarket and electronics big box stores in 
suburban malls. 
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Figure 3: Gender and parental status of employees by sector, 2007 
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Source: See Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 4: Race and ethnicity of employees by sector, 2007 
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Source: See Figure 1. 
Note: Black-white combination and a number of other smaller racial categories are omitted. 
 
Given the under-representation of Latinos and the fact that Latinos represent half of all foreign-
born workers, it is not surprising to learn that foreign-born workers are also under-represented in 
retail jobs, including frontline ones.  It is important to note, however, that given retail’s huge 
workforce, even six percent of the March 2007 retail workforce amounted to 918,000 foreign-
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born Latinos, that is, nine percent of the total number of Latino immigrants in private nonfarm 
jobs (calculated by authors from Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current Employment Statistics). 
 
Figure 5: Ethnicity and place of birth of employees by sector, 2007  
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Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Having surveyed who occupies retail jobs, we now turn our attention to the companies, their 
competitive strategies, and these strategies’ implication for job quality in the sector. 
 
III. Company strategies and their impacts on job quality 
 
The story of retail jobs in the US these days is a story of change as companies struggle to survive 
and grow in an increasingly saturated retail market.   For most companies, the challenge is to 
confront competition from Wal-Mart and other big-box retailers but also competition from e-
commerce in the case of consumer electronics.  These competitors exploit logistical economies 
of scale and market power over suppliers to drive down prices.  In response, retailers (including 
the big-box retailers themselves) have pursued two goals concurrently:  cutting costs, and 
increasing service. 
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Two strategic directions with implications for job quality 
 
Cutting or controlling costs: 
Retailers are wringing out cost savings from supply chains and inventory management as well as 
technology innovations in checking out procedures that are labor saving.  However, these 
innovations have for the most part been implemented and do not achieve the targeted levels of 
cost cutting.  In all stores, the single largest operating cost is the wage bill, hence cost cutting 
goes primarily through reducing labor costs—and therefore has clear implications for job quality 
and workers.   
 
For example, one of our field study cases, Marketland, is a regional chain that aims at the middle 
income customer and has faced significant competition in recent years from other supermarkets 
but most importantly from Wal-Mart supercenters.  It aims at the “middle market”, not as low as 
Wal-Mart and not as high as high-end chains.  It competes through using labor saving technology 
extensively and differentiates itself from Wal-Mart via convenience and providing a personal 
touch in customer service.  Nevertheless, its response to stiff competition has meant sharp 
reductions in labor resources (“labor hours”) in stores, limited raises, low entry-level wages and 
thus difficulty in recruiting.  One assistant manager indicated the importance of labor costs in the 
chain’s strategy: “Labor has been your number one expense because it’s your number one 
controllable. You have full control…you have little control of the beef you throw away. You have 
little control about your produce you throw away.  You have control of your labor.”  
 
Improving product quality and service (while also engaging in cost containment): 
We noted above that strategies to increase quality and variety of products and services occur in 
the context of cost containment, and even cost cutting.  Retailers have sought to improve service 
in two complementary ways: 
•  Increasing the variety and quality of products on offer—this may mean offering more 
products (e.g. exotic produce or prepared foods) but also services that complement the 
use of products sold (e.g. computer repair, home/car installation); 
• Increasing what we call the “density” of services, meaning increasing interaction with 
customers and/or increasing the amount of information offered. 
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For example, a number of consumer electronics retailers have reacted to falling margins on 
electronics goods (TVs and personal computers) by expanding service offerings:  PC 
repair/upgrade, appliance repair, system design consulting and home/auto installation of complex 
entertainment centers.  Also, goods are sold along with “attachments” of extended warranties and 
service contracts on which significant margins can still be charged.  Some of the large companies 
have attempted to create differentiated services within their stores for different customer 
categories, offering “off the shelf” products as well as elaborate customized system design 
services.  For general sales workers, job requirements have moved to customer relationship 
building and sales ability.  Technical knowledge (about audio systems for example) is less 
important than customer contact skills.  Only workers in specialized installation or repair 
positions are required to have technical skills and extensive product knowledge. 
 
Expanding product offerings has also taken place in food retail and requires more extensive 
worker awareness and, occasionally, deeper knowledge.  Implementing this “variety” strategy 
can run counter to cost cutting goals and, therefore, create difficulty for workers and supervisors. 
A store manager with over two decades at Food Chief described the result of the proliferation of 
brands: 
We used to be positioned where there might be two kinds of green beans on the shelf. 
Each kind was three cases wide, three cases deep, four cases high. What’s happened over 
time is that variety, variety, variety. Now maybe there’s ten kinds of green beans but all 
of them are three cans wide going to the back, so they’re not case-packed anymore. 
They’re hand-stacked. So we’ve taken some of our efficiencies out of the system. 
 
In short, Food and consumer electronics retailers seek to increase service overall, to increase 
quality and variety of offerings, while they also cut costs—all of                                                                                                
this has significant impacts on job quality.  However, this may generate increased demands on 
workers that are combined with speed-up, and a reduction in compensation; sometimes, all these 
undermine efforts to increase service. 
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IV. Retail job quality and the impact of new strategies 
A. Schedules 
 
Work schedules are a primary dimension of job quality in retail; the amount and predictability of 
work hours as well as the extent of worker choice about their hours very much color outcomes 
for workers in terms of total earnings and overall experience with employment.  In a sector 
where hourly wages are low on average but labor is the primary cost because retailing is labor 
intensive, work schedules have become the main lever for cost control.  Managers must sparingly 
manage their use of work hours and many retailers control manager access to overtime for hourly 
workers (paid time and a half for hours over 40).   In this environment, all managers at the store 
and district level aim to closely match labor deployment to customer ebbs and flows.  As a result, 
the amount of part-time, and full-time hours as well as their predictability vary. 
 
Additionally, work in retail entails nonstandard work hours because shoppers patron stores after 
conventional work hours.  The industry has moved to 7 days operation and, increasingly in food 
retail, to 24 hour operations.  With longer opening hours, the expectation that entry level staff 
work at least one weekend day and some evening or early morning hours has become 
widespread, particularly in food retail, where women are over represented.  Historically, grocery 
stores offered pay premia for Sunday work, which operated as a break on weekend scheduling 
and a bonus to workers, but these are being rolled back. 
 
For over thirty years, retail has had a high share of part-time employment relative to the 
economy wide average. This pattern has consequences for workers’ work-life and total earnings 
but also for benefit eligibility; for the most part part-time workers are excluded from company-
sponsored benefits (see next section). The dramatic shift toward part-time employment occurred 
in the 70’s and 80’s.  Part-time, consisting of any schedule from 10 to 30 hours, was used 
initially to hire youths for weekend and evening hours as well as mothers seeking short hours 
during the week.  However, our recent field work indicates that, for part-time (and full-time) 
workers, schedules  now mean a guaranteed minimum of hours with effective hours fluctuating 
upward on a weekly basis.  In other words, in their drive to control costs, stores use hours as 
shock absorbers, contingent on worker willingness to work hours beyond the minima.  As a 
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result, stores use two kinds of part-timers:  “gap fillers” and “time adjusters” (Jany-Catrice and 
Lehndorff 2005).  Gap fillers work short but predictable schedules (with low total earnings) and 
tend to be schooled youths while time adjusters are part-timers willing to have their hours flex 
upward in search of higher earnings. 
 
In food and consumer electronics retail, guaranteed full-time hours hover between 32 and 40 
hours.  In most consumer electronics big box stores, they are 32 weekly hours.  Effective work 
hours are higher.  Guaranteed part-time hours range from 8 to 30 hours.  Again, effective work 
hours for part-timers can go as high as 40 weekly hours.   
 
We find that the predictability of earnings and the control over one’s schedule are significantly 
affected by the practice of matching labor volume to customer flow in an environment of strict 
control over labor costs.  This pattern has significant implications for workers with care 
responsibilities (e.g. children in school), most often women. 
 
Scheduling practices are further affected by renewed attempts at cost cutting through labor cost 
cuts, particularly in retailers threatened by low price competition from multinational chains.   
Part-time no longer is growing rapidly but close to half of the typical full sized grocery or 
electronics store workforce is part-time.2
In this context of cost control, and even cost cutting, the impacts of strategies that increase 
service density can be negative for the workforce.  Managers make increasing demands on full-
timers to be available on short notice for shift changes and hours increases.
 (However, retail as a whole still has a majority of full-
time workers.) More importantly, all entry-level hiring is part-time; the schedule acts as a way 
station while workers are evaluated.  Also, cuts in staffing hours ratchets up the pressure on full-
time workers, especially store managers, who must fill gaps in staffing and pick up the slack.  In 
grocery stores, we heard of managers, and assistant managers, working up to 70 weekly hours 
without the benefit of overtime pay because these are salaried positions. 
 
3
                                               
2 Significant exceptions are some consumer electronics stores whose primary compensation scheme is commission 
pay.  These are an overwhelmingly full time workforce, particularly when commission accounts for the bulk of pay. 
3 In unionized grocers, seniority can provide workers with greater control over the schedules, and the option to turn 
down specific hours, but this principle is under attack in companies facing significant price competition and seeking 
cost savings. 
  In environments 
with lean staff and increased product variety, full-timers are the repositories of department-
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specific knowledge and take on supervisory responsibility for less experienced part-timers.  This 
renders full-time jobs, most often the only jobs providing sufficient earnings and access to health 
insurance and other benefits, difficult to reconcile with care responsibilities. For part-time “time 
adjusters” working extra hours entails schedule unpredictability with consequences for life 
outside of work.  For “gap fillers”, schedule predictability is achieved at the cost of low earnings.  
In short, the appeal and downfall of retail work, particularly frontline retail work, is the option to 
work short hours and attempt to reconcile these with responsibilities outside of work. 
 
Because part-time is an employment status as well as a schedule, we look in Table 1 at who gets 
part-time or full-time jobs.  This is particularly important because, as we shall see in the next 
section, part-time jobs are much more poorly compensated (in terms of hourly wage and 
availability of benefits such as health insurance). Table 1 reveals several important patterns in 
who works part-time.  Scanning down the table to compare demographic groups, it is not 
surprising to learn that less-educated workers (which includes youths who are still in high 
school) are more likely to work part-time than their more educated counterparts, and that more 
women work part-time than men.  Perhaps more surprising is the fact that blacks and Latinos are 
less likely to work part-time than Anglo whites, with foreign-born workers least likely of all.4
                                               
4 It is possible that black and Latino workers stay in retail, for lack of access to higher paid, more desirable, job 
opportunities elsewhere in the economy.  With seniority, retail workers tend to move to full-time work and thus 
blacks and Latinos are less likely to be in part-time jobs than others.  Data reviewed here do not prove this point but 
indicate a different pattern for these groups than in the economy overall. 
  It 
appears that white young workers and women make up the bulk of the part-time workforce 
economy-wide as well as in retail.   
 
The situation of women with children merits separate commentary.  Contrary to expectations, 
women with dependent children (under 18) have a lower rate of part-time employment than 
women as a whole.  Women with children under 6 are more likely to work part-time than women 
with older children, as expected, but even this rate exceeds the average only for all women only 
in the economy as a whole, not in any of the retail sectors.  Statistically, we are seeing the impact 
of continuing increases in the labor force participation of women with children, combined with 
the large group of (childless) student-age women (plus a smaller group of older women) in 
retail’s part-time jobs.  Gap-filler jobs for young mothers are the exception rather than the rule in 
part-time employment in retail. 
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Scanning across columns to compare sectors confirms that the rate of part-time employment is 
higher in retail, and higher still in the frontline jobs.  Separating sub-sectors shows that frontline 
grocery workers are twice as likely to work part-time as clerks and cashiers in electronics retail. 
 
Finally, comparing demographic differences across sectors tells us still more.  The education gap 
in the rate of part-time employment is far wider in retail than economy-wide, reflecting the large 
share of less-than-high-school employees who are under 18 in retail.  Part-time percentages by 
race within electronics frontline jobs point to the down-side of the slight over-representation of 
blacks in the consumer electronics rank-and-file: these black workers are disproportionately part-
time, reversing the aggregate racial pattern of part-time employment.  Perhaps most striking, the 
percentage of men who are part-time edges above that for women among grocery front-line 
workers reflecting the very large cohort of males among young part-time workers in food retail. 
 
Table 1: Percent of various demographic groups who work part-time, by sector, 2007 
  Total Retail - All Retail - Frontline Electronics - Frontline Grocery - Frontline 
Total 18.6% 27.9% 40.9% 25.3% 50.4% 
            
Less than high 
school 32.9% 50.3% 64.3% 66.9% 77.7% 
High school or 
more 16.4% 24.0% 35.3% 20.2% 38.0% 
            
Men 11.9% 19.8% 32.2% 17.3% 51.0% 
Women 26.4% 36.1% 48.0% 44.1% 49.9% 
Women with 
children under 18 25.4% 28.3% 36.5% 19.4% 34.0% 
Women with 
children under 6 28.7% 31.8% 41.8% 24.0% 36.0% 
            
White 20.0% 28.7% 43.4% 21.4% 54.2% 
Black 16.5% 26.2% 35.3% 41.7% 50.4% 
Latino 15.3% 24.2% 34.4% 23.7% 40.9% 
            
Native 19.7% 29.1% 42.6% 25.6% 53.5% 
Foreign-born 13.7% 19.7% 28.9% 23.1% 31.3% 
Source: See Figure 1 
 
To keep the aggregate data analysis manageable, we forego tracking compensation differences 
for all these different demographic groups.  Instead, we exploit the disproportionate rate of part-
time employment among certain groups (young people, women, black workers in consumer 
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electronics) by using part-time employment as our distinguishing characteristic in compensation 
levels. 
 
B) Compensation  
 
We first paint the overall retail compensation landscape with summary statistics, and then turn to 
our qualitative data to flesh out retailers’ concerns, strategies, and policies, and their bearing on 
compensation and job quality.  Table 2 summarizes hourly and weekly wages separately by part-
time and full-time workers across the sectors of concern.  Retail is indeed a low-wage industry in 
hourly terms for both part-time and full-time workers, with a particularly large gap for part-
timers.  Nonetheless, average pay levels diverge significantly across retail sub-sectors.  Whereas 
frontline workers in grocery earn only 57 percent per hour as much as the average across all 
private industries, their consumer electronics counterparts earn a considerably more respectable 
85 percent.  This redirects our attention to Figures 1, 2, and 3, which showed that the electronics 
retail workforce is older, more educated, and more male than that in grocery.  Paying more 
experienced and more educated employers is certainly legitimate, but the towering electronics-
grocery difference in gender mix (23 percentage points) suggests that at least some of the wage 
gap is gender-related and at least partly due to historical gender-based pay differences. 
 
The other striking finding in Table 2 is the size of the part-time/full-time wage gap in retail.  On 
an hourly basis, retail part-timers earn 33 percent less than full-timers (and 68 percent less on a 
weekly basis)—a disadvantage markedly exceeding that of part-timers economy-wide (23 
percent).  Remarkably, the gap is widest of all among frontline workers in electronics retail, who 
earn 55 percent less than their full-time colleagues—earning less in hourly terms than grocery 
part-timers, even though electronics full-timers earn more.  This is consistent with the apparent 
age, education, and gender foundation of the electronics wage advantage, because part-timers in 
electronics are younger, less educated, and more often female than full-timers.  Thus, earnings in 
consumer electronics retail are higher on average, but are distributed far more unequally. 
 
Table 3 reinforces the importance of the retail wage penalty, and the part-time wage penalty 
within retail.  Using the nominal value of the federal minimum wage as of July 2008 ($6.55) as a 
yardstick, it examines the percentage of workers falling below this level in the prior year.  While 
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only 1-in-19 private sector workers slip below the benchmark, 1-in-12 retail workers do, as do 1-
in-5 part-time, frontline retail workers.  Many retail workers stand to benefit from the relatively 
modest increases in the minimum wage adopted by Congress in 2007. 
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Table 2: Average hourly and weekly earnings by sector and part-time/full-time status, 2007 
  Total Retail - All Retail - Frontline Electronics - Frontline Grocery - Frontline 
  Total PT FT Total PT FT Total PT FT Total PT FT Total PT FT 
Average 
hourly $ 18.95  15.22  19.71  14.85  10.88  16.16  11.81  8.68  13.67  16.03  7.79  17.33  10.84  8.60  13.03  
Average 
weekly $ 745.20  304.63  840.45  563.95  216.00  685.59  413.56  180.50  561.90  658.28  120.84  740.44  338.75  173.17  501.38  
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 3: Percent of workers in March 2007 falling below July 2008 minimum wage threshold of $6.55, by sector and part-
time/full-time status 
  Total Retail Retail - Frontline 
Total PT FT Total PT FT Total PT FT 
Percent with hourly 
earnings < $6.55 5.2% 13.8% 3.4% 8.2% 16.5% 5.3% 11.6% 18.3% 7.4% 
Source: See Figure 1. 
 
Table 4: Percentage who got health insurance from own or family member’s employer in 2006, by sector and part-time/full-
time status 
  Total Retail Electronics Grocery 
  Total PT FT Total PT FT Total PT FT Total PT FT 
% with health insurance from 
own employer 53.4% 18.6% 61.4% 44.6% 16.9% 55.3% 51.0% 5.8% 60.4% 42.0% 16.2% 56.6% 
% with health insurance from 
family member’s employer 69.9% 53.9% 73.6% 65.8% 56.3% 69.5% 67.0% 56.3% 69.3% 61.6% 51.9% 67.1% 
Source: See Figure 1. 
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Table 4 examines another key dimension of compensation, health insurance.  Again, there is a 
retail disadvantage, and once more the penalty is smaller for consumer electronics employees.  A 
part-time disadvantage in access to health benefits applies economy-wide, and for the most part 
the part-time/full-time gap in health benefits in retail in particular is unremarkable (save for the 
fact that the very large proportion of part-time in retail means numerous workers are impacted by 
the lack of health insurance).  The exception is part-timers in electronics retailing: they are a jaw-
dropping 10 percent as likely to get health benefits as full-timers, whereas in grocery stores the 
ratio is 29 percent.  Broadening our attention to consider employer-sponsored health benefits 
from any family member softens the part-time/full-time differences, especially for consumer 
electronics employees, but does not eliminate them. 
 
Our field work on food and consumer electronics retail subsectors adds important illustrative 
detail about compensation structures in these sectors and how they are affected by enterprise 
strategies.   As we have noted, consumer electronics jobs pay higher than grocery jobs on 
average, but there is also a larger part-time/full-time gap in electronics; thus, pay structures differ 
significantly and we discuss them separately. 
 
Food retail 
 
In food retail, wages start low and progress steadily but not steeply.  (The Appendix provides 
examples of pay structures in sample companies; these sample wages are for jobs, not particular 
individuals.)  Hourly pay difference between full-time and part-time job is partially due to the 
fact that full-time is only available to workers beyond entry level positions.  The divide with the 
greatest impact on compensation is access to, and employer sponsorship of, group health 
insurance as was illustrated by aggregate data as well.  However, some food retailers have 
experimented with making available group health (individual) coverage for part-time workers.  
Also, union representation which only occurs in food retail, yields a higher level of pay as well 
as benefits access, and includes a role for seniority in pay increases. 
 
Retailers cost cutting strategies have resulted in wage increases that lag behind those in other 
sectors. This is particularly true in unionized retailers that seek to limit the wage differential 
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between themselves and non-union companies as collective bargaining becomes less prevalent is 
the sector.  Cost saving also includes paring back benefit packages (as other sectors have done), 
primarily by shifting from family to individual health coverage, and increasing the share of the 
premium paid by workers.  Partly as a result, retail jobs, even if full-time ones, are less appealing 
to heads of households as a primary job.  In this environment of restrained wage growth, some 
grocers have experimented with some limited forms of variable pay (department bonuses, 
manager gifts of cash coupons) across all job levels but they are the exception rather than the 
rule. 
 
Consumer electronics retail 
 
In consumer electronics, our cases mirror the aggregate patterns: though the average pay is 
higher than in food retail, there is a greater differential between part-time and full-time hourly 
pay.  Furthermore, in our sample of large companies, as in the aggregate statistics, benefits were 
rarely accessible to part-timers.  Additionally, variable pay options (group/department/store 
bonuses) play a noticeable role in compensation. 
 
Cost cutting strategies have taken the form of removing commission pay because formulas for it 
came to be seen as “too generous” at a time when margins are dropping on electronics products, 
particularly personal computers and televisions.  Often, the shift to hourly and salary pay is 
accompanied by a relative increase in part-time positions and lower base pay in these jobs.  
Variable pay schemes—incentives to sell particular products, or reward based on department and 
store performance—pay a greater role in this sector.  While they represent an option to improve 
one’s earnings, they are occasionally presented as a reason for not awarding more generous 
increases in base pay.  Overall, electronics retailers in our study also reduced benefit packages 
and are reducing the employer share of insurance premiums although some are considering pared 
down versions of individual health coverage for part-timers, given the pre-eminence of this 
concern in their workforce and nationwide.   
 
In sum, retail is characterized by low average wages for entry-level workers and others relative 
to the national average. More importantly, it displays significant pay differentiation by 
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employment status (part-time vs. full-time), demographic category, and subsector.  Benefits have 
been pared down over the past 10 years; these include health insurance, of course, but also the 
amount of paid time off (sick, vacation, personal time).  The reduced compensation and benefits 
make the jobs less viable for heads of households.  Yet, for new entrants, young workers, and 
parents who cannot work full-time, the experimentation with individual health coverage for part-
timers may be beneficial. 
 
C) Mobility and duties 
 
In this section, we bundle together a number of different job characteristics: training, duties, 
turnover, and upward mobility.  Although these job features are conceptually distinct, in practice 
they are closely linked.  Because turnover is very high in retail, retailers seek to limit initial job 
training.  In turn, this means that most knowledge and responsibility is exercised by senior 
employees who have years of on-the-job learning.  Given this division of labor, there are indeed 
opportunities for promotion—but few employees actually move up.  We first look at training, 
turnover and duties, and examine the connections with promotion opportunities.   
 
C.1. Training and turnover 
 
 C.1.a. Training and turnover in food retail 
Training for baggers and cashiers is short and effective: it entails no more than a handful of days.  
This is why it is possible for labor force entrants and others to access these jobs without prior 
training.  Turnover is high in retail, particularly food retail—it usually stems from employee 
quits.  In sample companies in our study, turnover rates ranged from 40 to 80 percent with a 
single exception—a company that consciously pays wages above industry average to reduce 
turnover.  These averages hide significant differences in turnover between part-time and full-
time workers; at one company turnover is 12 times higher for part-timers.  Managers quickly 
identify and groom supervisory/management prospects while managing a high turnover, mostly 
part time, workforce.  Grocery chains seem to have high rates of promotion from within.  In our 
study, case companies reported estimates of 60 to 90 percent or more of upper level hourly jobs 
and store-level management positions are filled from within; among them, discounters claimed 
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that 98 to 99 percent of jobs are filled from within. For those who do not turn over, there are 
ways to move up to supervisory positions. 
 
C.1.b. Training and turnover in consumer electronics retail 
In consumer electronics, initial training for sales associates positions is surprisingly short (20 
hours).  Technical positions (design of systems, computer and entertainment systems repair and 
installation) require more intensive training.  In our field work cases, turnover is higher in 
electronics than food retailers—sample companies had turnover ranging from 68 to 86 percent—
perhaps reflecting the less frequent opportunity to move up, and many opportunities in similarly 
paid positions in other retailers, as well as the demise of commission pay (and thus of the 
prospects of high pay). 
 
We do have evidence that sales associates can move up into supervisory and management 
positions.  But electronics chains recruit from a broad range of retail sectors (e.g. house wares) 
for managerial positions and the internal pipeline plays a less important role.  Most (5) 
companies in our study reported 50 percent or less of store managers were recruited from within.  
(Outliers had rates of internal hiring on a par with food retailers.)  Other factors that affect these 
patterns are the rapid growth and geographic expansion of these relatively recent retailers and, 
thus, the limits of internal pools. 
 
C.2 Duties 
 
 C.2.a.  Duties in food retail                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
The appeal of food retail jobs is that they are relatively unskilled. Some say that is a drawback. 
Yet this relative lack of formal skill requirements makes retail jobs a ready avenue for access to 
employment for those with little or no work experience.  However, requirements for promotion 
to full-time jobs, with access to benefits, are more stringent.  This reflects reliance on internal 
pipelines for staffing supervisory and even managerial positions.   
 
Multifunctionality is common; workers get pulled into other tasks as needed. On the whole, there 
is greater autonomy for full-timers than part-timers with the former providing direction and 
 
 
23 
supervision.  Cashiering is standardized, and scan rates are monitored and used in supervision to 
some degree. 
 
C.2.b. Duties in consumer electronics retail 
There is far more stratification of jobs in consumer electronics.  Positions can range from 
cashiering and general sales floor help to selling (and occasionally designing) large ticket items 
including home entertainment systems and installation services.  The latter encompass technical 
jobs such as repair technician or home/mobile installers for which the skills required are usually 
not acquired in the store, within the internal path of promotion.  We do not have clear evidence 
that sales associates can move from nontechnical sales floor positions to technical positions 
through internal training options.   
 
On the sales floor, multifunctionality occurs.  In large enough stores, there is a dedicated cashier 
position, otherwise sales floor staff ring up sales, another opportunity to offer service contracts, 
extended warranty products, and other “attachments.” 
 
C.3 The impact of new strategies on duties and mobility 
 
 C.3.a The impact of cost-cutting 
 
Cost cutting approaches have an impact on worker duties because the drive to reduce labor costs 
leads to an escalation of the pace of work.  In food retail, frontline workers and supervisors 
interviewed for our study reported growing difficulty with getting work done.  A produce clerk at 
a grocery store (Homestyle) described the pressure as follows: “If they weren't gonna give any 
more hours, and they're not going to, they'd have to come up with a better system of being able 
to get it all done without killing people.”  Work overload can be a source of turnover in the 
industry, given the low pay.  This kind of speedup seems to be less visible in consumer 
electronics, perhaps because the industry is more recent than food retail and started with a leaner 
staffing model right off the bat. 
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Cost cutting strategies impact turnover and mobility in complicated ways.  In food and consumer 
electronics retail, turnover is a tool used by managers to “fine tune” their workforce use to meet 
sometimes competing strategic goals.  They must keep it low enough to keep the desired workers 
to fill the internal promotion pipeline but also have it high enough to hold seniority based pay 
progression in check as well as having the option to refresh their team with new hires. 
 
Also, in companies that have increased the share of part-time to cut costs, turnover usually 
increases.  From the frontline worker standpoint, turnover presents some advantages.  It 
generates a steadily high volume of job openings and thus multiple options to enter and re-enter 
the world of retail.  It seems that entry level job candidates make use of this “flexibility” in 
numerous parts of retail. However, the relative ease of access to retail jobs that is generated by 
turnover has been tempered by the fact that screening and hiring procedures for frontline jobs 
have been getting slightly more stringent.  Candidates are increasingly required to fill out an 
online application (rather than simply speak to a supervisor) and need to show evidence of some 
steady work experience. 
 
Unionized retailers have historically provided workforce training and experienced lower turnover 
than non union retailers. Yet, cost cutting strategies have entailed a drastic decline in 
compensation for them which in turn has prompted an increase in turnover. 
 
Finally, cost cutting has not affected training very much because retail is a world with little 
formal training investment.  In consumer electronics, retailers have shifted to using e-learning 
tools as means to save on training cost.   
 
 C.3.b The impact of service and quality increases 
In food retail, the strategy of offering more variety and quality of products imposes new demands 
on workers in terms of knowledge base and behavior.  For example, frontline worker need to 
know something about a broader range of products.  This is particularly true of those in the 
produce and deli departments. Frontline workers do receive more training than in the past; 
training modules on customer service basics and on new products or food preparation tips are 
offered.  Providing convenience (particularly speedy check-out) as well as frequently refreshed 
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produce displays is staff intensive; other, lesser priority, areas experience staff cuts and work 
overload.   
 
In consumer electronics, sales workers must become familiar with the growing range of service 
offerings instead of simply selling products “off the shelf.”  The shift toward including services 
as well as products in the store offerings has introduced greater variety and skill levels for the 
tasks and duties of frontline workers.  Yet, the selling tasks remain similar (qualifying customers 
with questions). Workers on the floor must master a mix of product knowledge and service 
skills.  Where, in years past, workers selling higher priced products would have needed extensive 
product knowledge, the mix of skills now includes a greater share of customer service skills. 
 
In both sectors but more so in consumer electronics there is a greater propensity than a decade 
ago to recruit assistant managers and store managers from other parts of retail or other industries.  
The increased emphasis on customer service and the greater standardization of management 
practice, combined with greater availability of college graduates, make this shift possible. 
 
C.4 Who gets the promotions? 
 
We already asked who has the jobs in retail.  On the terrain of mobility, the question is who gets 
the promotions.  We are not analyzing longitudinal data, but given that most retail managers are 
promoted from within, a snapshot of the representation of a given demographic group at various 
levels of the occupational hierarchy offers a good first approximation of promotion probabilities.  
In any case, the demographic composition of supervisory and managerial ranks is interesting in 
its own right.   
 
Figure 6 shows that when we examine the drop-off in the proportion of women in higher level 
occupations, retail as a whole has a profile very similar to the average across all industries.  But 
once more, differences within the retail sector loom large.  Women face the steepest uphill battle 
in consumer electronics retail, where their representation among part-timers is 6.5 times as high 
as among managers, compared to a ratio of 1.7 economy-wide—again, indicating more 
inequality within consumer electronics.  Advancement opportunities in grocery stores are also 
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tilted against women, but with a ratio of 2.2, far less disadvantageous to women than the 
situation in electronics retailing. (Bringing up women’s retail-wide percentage in supervisory and 
managerial ranks is their higher representation in clothing and general merchandise stores, not 
shown.) 
 
Figure 6: Percent female by occupation and sector, 2007 
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Source: See Figure 1.  For “all industries,” frontline is defined as including all occupations other 
than managers and professionals. 
 
Figures 7 and 8 repeat the same exercise for black and Latino workers.  Again, the racial and 
ethnic profiles of the occupational hierarchy for retail as a whole are similar to those for the 
entire economy, although overall percentages of blacks and Latinos are lower (as we noted in our 
discussion of Figure 4).  The same is true on the whole for grocery stores except blacks are 
slightly more likely to be in managerial ranks in stores than in the economy overall (while 
Latinos are not).5
                                               
5 It is possible that black workers remain in retail jobs longer than other groups, for lack of opportunities in other 
industrial sectors, and have occasions to move up to manager rank whereas they do so with less frequency in other 
sectors.   
  In consumer electronics, however, blacks face steep disadvantages in 
advancement akin to those faced by women: although they make up 21 percent of part-time 
workers, there was not a single black consumer electronics manager in our sample (CPS national 
sample). Latinos, on the other hand, are much more evenly spread across occupational categories 
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in electronics stores, even though their overall representation in the sub-sector is the same as that 
of blacks at 11 percent.  
 
Figure 7: Percent black by occupation and sector, 2007 
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Source: See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 8: Percent Latino by occupation and retail sub-sector, 2007 
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Source: See Figure 6. 
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C 4. Key mobility and duties findings with policy implications 
 
 General patterns 
In some regards, retail, particularly food retail, has offered opportunities for frontline job 
candidates. It has generated numerous entry level jobs and taken in those job candidates with 
limited skills.  To a degree it has rewarded those willing to work nonstandard hours, for not very 
good pay, with opportunities for internal promotion.  Food retail, in particular, has drawn in 
women and could be a sector where women with limited formal training can move up because of 
the extent of promotion from within.  However, we find differential access to promotion 
opportunities by gender, as well as race, ethnicity, and nativity. 
 
 Effects of new competitive strategies 
 
In sum, the most salient effects of recent competitive strategies we have discussed in this paper 
result in a “mixed bag” of opportunities and choices for workers considering employment in 
retail.  We observe a clash between the competing goals of cutting costs and improving service 
and quality:  Speed ups and raised expectations about performance lead to increases in 
turnover/quits, which in turn makes the jobs of those in place more difficult.  
 
Opportunities for promotion are still available, at least in the two sectors we explored in depth  
(as well as in department stores) with the caveat that, women and in some cases minorities 
experience relatively greater difficulty than men with accessing promotions.  Promotion 
opportunities are open to those without college degrees, particularly relative to the situation in 
other sectors but the jobs are less desirable than in the past; nonstandard hours are ubiquitous (7 
days store openings and evening hours), job demands have increased for those interested in 
promotion; and the pay gradient is flatter than historically.  
 
These new pressures to deliver more and higher quality work efforts as well as the shifts in 
rewards (flatter wage profile) lead to some reluctance to take on supervisory positions among 
frontline workers.  This reluctance is even stronger when workers consider bidding for assistant 
managers and manager positions. These positions also entail a shift to salary compensation and 
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the loss of overtime pay. In food retail, these managerial positions are now difficult to manage 
with family responsibilities, particularly those for very young and school age children, because 
of the long and nonstandard hours and the responsibility to be “on call” for a good part of the 
week. 
 
We also observe changes in recruiting and promotion practices that have mixed consequences for 
workers seeking advancement in retail.  In both food and electronics retail, there is a move 
toward recruiting or promoting college graduates for store managers, a trend which will work 
against those without degrees.  A related pattern is the move toward recruiting from the outside 
(particularly in electronics), a shift that is particularly feasible because of changes in retail 
management practice.  Management is now more number driven and computer based, and entails 
skills that are transferrable across retailers so company specific knowledge has become relatively 
less valuable. This latter shift may have beneficial effects for workers who reach assistant 
manager and store manager ranks.  It may increase prospects for career advancement because 
candidates may have opportunities for lateral mobility across parts of retail and from other fields 
into retail.  Hence they may have the option to escape relatively low paid managerial positions 
and seek better options, not being dependent on company-specific knowledge and skills. 
 
V. Policy implications 
 
As the largest industrial sector in the US, and the largest low-wage industry as well, retail 
compels policy attention.  As we have demonstrated, average compensation is low relative to 
other sectors and, more importantly, relative pay has worsened and shows signs of becoming 
more unequal.  Scheduling issues, both the short weekly hours and the expectation of flexibility 
and availability for weekend and evening work, pose particular challenges for workers with 
family responsibilities.  Promotion opportunities, particularly those for workers with limited 
education, are unequally available and appear to be diminishing overall.   Because retail is such a 
large provider of entry-level jobs, improving job quality and reducing inequalities in retail will 
have impact on the experiences of numerous low-wage workers.   In this section, we raise several 
areas for policy action.  We use retail jobs as a window into a broader set of low-quality job 
characteristics; some of the policy actions we identify would impact job quality in other low-
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wage sectors as well.  In particular, retail exemplifies a set of direct-service jobs for which 
employer relocation is not an option, and reputation can directly affect consumer choices.  
Immobility and the weight of reputation generate a key set of leverage points. 
 
Compensation 
 
Perhaps first and foremost, steady increases in the minimum wage that ensure that its real value 
increases over time would have an immediate and direct impact on retail wages.  Table 3 above 
shows that even the modest increases passed in 2007 have had/will have a large effect; as of 
early 2007, nearly 12% of frontline retail workers were below the mid-2008 mandated minimum 
wage.  Because the wages of entry level jobs are pegged slightly above the minimum wage and 
will rise with it, minimum wage increases are a first, and potent, tool for improving 
compensation.  Retail’s immobility enhances the minimum wage’s power to improve jobs in the 
sector; indeed, this is why retail and restaurant interests have historically led business campaigns 
against minimum wage increases (Tilly 2005).  We also note that, in several European countries 
(notably France), the share of low-wage employment in retail is significantly lower than in the 
US in part because the minimum wage is set at a higher level (Carré, Tilly, vanKlaveren, and 
Voss-Dahm forthcoming). 
 
Secondly, the way retail (and other) jobs have improved historically has been through gaining 
union representation and collective bargaining.  Wages are indeed higher in unionized retailers 
than in other companies.  Increasing union density would contribute to increase compensation. 
However, as we know, the tide has run very much the other way.  As of 2006, union density was 
5.4% in retail overall, down from 7.8 percent twenty years earlier.  By sub-sector, union density 
was 19% in food retail and near zero on consumer electronics (authors’ calculations from CPS 
data, Hirsch and McPherson 2006).   What role can national policy play in this regard?  Labor 
law reform aimed at removing institutional and managerial hurdles to organizing, representation, 
and securing a bargaining contract can only be implemented at the national level.  The possible 
confluence of a Democratic presidency with Democratic majorities in Congress may offer 
possibilities unparalleled since 1994.  However, knowledgeable observers have pointed out the 
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formidable obstacles such legislation faces even in the most favorable of circumstances (Weil 
forthcoming). 
 
Absent national, comprehensive, reform of the rules for gaining access to union representation, 
other options include local and regional approaches such as corporate accountability schemes 
linked to local development activities.  For example, company “neutrality” in unionization 
drives—i.e. not conducting an anti-union campaign— might be mandated as a condition for 
receiving tax abatements and public subsidies for the development of a mall.  Local coalitions 
have begun winning such mandates in a number of jurisdictions (Good Jobs First 2008, Tilly 
2005). 
 
Recently, unions’ principal strategy directed toward retail jobs has consisted of corporate 
campaigns aimed at limiting the growth of Wal-Mart on the premise that its market, supplier, and 
labor strategies set the pace for other retailers.  Their approach has mainly taken the form of 
publicity campaigns (the SEIU’s Wal-Mart Watch, the United Food and Commercial Workers’ 
Wake Up Wal-Mart) aimed at keeping the retailer on the defensive.   
 
Unions may be able to tap other strategies.  For example, union organizing strategies that are 
region-wide or sector-wide may be a viable option.  Examples of such practices can be drawn 
from successful union drives such as that among service industries connected to, and located in 
the vicinity of the Los Angeles and San Francisco’s airports (a regional approach) or the 
successful Justice for Janitors campaigns in Los Angeles (and nationwide) and organizing of LA 
drywall workers (sectoral approaches) (Milkman 2006, Wial 1993).  Naturally, a retail industry 
dominated by a few industry leaders in each region requires a somewhat different approach than 
highly fragmented, subcontracted industries such as building cleaning and construction.  
Nonetheless, the particular features of modern retail potentially render it vulnerable to related 
new strategies.  Just-in-time inventory systems, a core element of the big-box model perfected by 
Wal-Mart and its peers, is hypersensitive to choke points in transportation and warehousing 
(Piven 2008).  Retailers battling for dominance in a saturated market can readily close a store to 
block unionization, but can ill afford to surrender an entire region, presenting an opening for 
regional strategies. 
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Perhaps the most interesting current application of such strategies is the Wal-Mart Alliance for 
Reform Now (WARN) launched by the community organization ACORN6
Schedule and work life 
 in Central Florida.   
WARN seeks to use resistance to Wal-Mart store openings in the highly attractive Central 
Florida market as a bargaining chip to demand better jobs and more community accountability 
from Wal-Mart (Wal-Mart Alliance for Reform Now 2008).  In parallel, the WARN-affiliated 
Wal-Mart Workers’ Association (WWA), a membership organization that is not a union, has 
mobilized employee direct action (petitions, marches, even walkouts) to win shop-floor 
demands.  WWA has also used mass filings for unemployment insurance by fired and laid-off 
Wal-Mart employees to press the company, in some cases successfully, for more employee-
friendly scheduling policies (Nesius 2005, Robinson 2006). 
 
Thirdly, advocates for working women have long called for mandating pay parity between part-
time and full-time workers (Carré, duRivage, and Tilly 1998).  The US is an exception among 
developed countries in legally tolerating a pay differential based on a schedule-related 
employment status.  (In fact, the European Union has passed a directive for member states to 
mandate such pay parity [Carré, van Klaveren, Tilly, and Voss-Dahm forthcoming].) The 
proposal repeatedly advanced by former Congresswoman Patricia Schroeder and others since the 
mid-1980s (and also proposed in a number of state legislatures) also calls for prorated benefit 
access in those workplaces where there are employer-sponsored benefits.  This mandate would 
affect all part-time workers but have particular impact on retail workers because of the high 
incidence of part-time work.  The crisis over health insurance access may propel this proposal 
farther along in the legislative process during the coming years. 
 
 
The week-to-week variability, unpredictability, and lack of choice regarding work hours 
significantly impact work and life decisions for retail workers in the United States.  This need 
not be so.  Retailers in Western Europe have learned to operate in environments where they must 
                                               
6 ACORN is the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, the largest community organization of 
low and moderate income families in the country. 
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provide significantly more advance notice of scheduling to their employees.  Perhaps most 
striking, Danish retail bargaining agreements mandate 16 week advance notice of schedules 
while German collective bargaining agreements mandate 26 weeks advance notice.  While these 
mandates are not strictly adhered to, and amended through consultation with works’ councils in 
Germany for example, they give rise to a situation far different from the US worker experience 
of receiving their schedule anywhere from three days to two weeks in advance. 
 
So-called “blue” laws could be passed to limit store opening hours, for stores of large size in 
particular.  While seven day opening is likely to remain the norm, a mandated restriction on 24, 
or even 18 hour, operation would reduce some of the scheduling pressures on workers and 
management.  Retailers might even welcome an end to what one manager called the “arms race” 
of store opening hours which has compelled stores to remain open for many unprofitable hours 
simply to match the competition.  Though opening hours restrictions have generally been set by 
local ordinance, the rapid concentration of US retailing in the hands of a small number of 
corporations offers a compelling rationale for state or even (following an “interstate commerce” 
logic) federal regulation. 
 
As the European examples hint, union representation might enable workers to achieve more 
predictable hours through collectively bargained arrangements for advance notice, and more 
scheduling choice for workers.  The record of US unionized workplaces does not indicate a great 
deal of flexibility on scheduling so we expect that scheduling options that are available in some 
European countries are a function of a combination of institutional parameters—store hour 
restrictions as well as collective bargaining. 
 
Access to hiring and promotion—particularly targeting access to better jobs (e.g. in 
electronics) 
 
Both the aggregate statistics and the flurry of lawsuits claiming gender- and race-based 
discrimination in pay and promotion point to the need for more promotion opportunities to be 
more equitably distributed across the workforce.  As of now, the primary “regulatory” 
mechanism has consisted of private class-action lawsuits and individual claims; most major 
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national chains have experienced these (Carré, Holgate, and Tilly 2006).  Other policy options 
need to be explored as alternatives to piecemeal lawsuits.  Perhaps a low hanging fruit is for 
regulatory agencies and/or equity advocates to review in an on-going way the increasingly 
ubiquitous online screening tests and applications on which retailers rely.  Establishing standards 
for all vendors of such software to meet, as well as for individual retailers to follow, could help 
to eliminate discriminatory barriers in hiring. 
 
Regarding equity in promotion, a combination of “carrots and sticks” approaches would achieve 
progress (see Moss and Tilly 2001).  A possible “carrot” approach is the creation of a federal or 
state Diversity Extension Service providing technical assistance to employers who want to do the 
right thing in hiring and promotion, an approach that has been used in other settings.  For 
example, government assistance has been provided (e.g. through community colleges) for giving 
managers Spanish classes to aid in supervision.  This approach would follow those considered 
and recommended by federal glass ceiling commissions in the past.  A “sticks” disciplinary 
approach would be to institute a monitoring and early warning system that would record and 
communicate problems that show up on EEO-1 (Equal Employment Opportunity) forms before a 
situation gets to the point of litigation.  The impact of such a monitoring system would be 
strengthened if it is complemented with some exemplary litigation undertaken by the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission and state-level EEO agencies to put companies on notice 
and to raise public awareness of the issues. 
 
A further consideration is that women’s access to, and ability to avail themselves of, promotion 
opportunities are often hindered by the stringent demands of retail schedules and their 
incompatibility with family responsibilities, both the care of the young and the support of elder 
family members.  Progress on scheduling practices and strides in considering explicitly ways to 
achieve more schedule predictability could have significant effects on the gender pattern of 
promotions as well and complement formal equal employment opportunity approaches.   
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Forms of organization: Beyond unions 
 
For many of the policy areas and approaches considered, we expect community groups or 
associations can be a means to trigger public attention and information, to sustain the calls for 
action, and to monitor implementation.  Policy by itself would remain dead letter otherwise.  We 
are mindful that retail, in spite of concentrated ownership, consists of a multitude of scattered 
workplaces that have historically proved difficult ground for government traditional means of 
enforcement which are inspections.  Empowered groups of workers and community residents can 
do more to monitor and report violations to a statute or agreement than inspectors can (Carré and 
Joshi 2000; Fine 2007; Heckscher and Carré 2006).  The role of such labor-community-advocacy 
hybrid organizations is an important one to consider, particularly if unionization continues to lag. 
 
Wal-Mart Watch and Wake Up Wal-Mart represent one approach combining sophisticated 
communications campaigns with some degree of coalition-building on the ground.  WARN’s 
grassroots campaign in Florida takes a different tack.  Organizations in other, related sectors 
have adopted still others mixes of strategies.  The example of the Restaurant Opportunities 
Center of New York (ROC-NY) is a suggestive one.  ROC-NY combines research, litigation, 
organizing, advocacy, workforce development, and a roundtable of “high-road” restaurateurs to 
improve restaurant jobs in New York City (Restaurant Opportunities Center-New York 2005, 
2008).  ROC has honed a model that systematically uses class-action suit settlements as a 
substitute for collective bargaining, sidestepping many of the limitations the National Labor 
Relations Act imposes on unions (Saru Jayaraman, personal communication, 6/18/08).  ROC is 
now in the process of extending the model to six other regions.  The restaurant industry’s 
immobility and the importance of reputation suggest possible parallels in the retail arena. 
 
 
36 
VI. Research for Policy Analysis and Advocacy 
Targeted research is needed to fuel and guide this policy and strategy agenda.  Four research 
directions are particularly useful in this regard: 
 Building up the body of retail case-based research.  Case studies make it possible to link 
corporate market strategies, employment practices, labor supply, and job quality 
outcomes.  As we have argued explicitly and implicitly throughout this paper, those 
linkages can open a much deeper understanding of what generates variation in job 
quality, what could lead to better jobs, and the likely impact of various policy options and 
advocacy strategies in this complex system. 
 Reviewing and assessing the transferability of models that have achieved success in other 
sectors.  To what extent can sectoral models such as ROC—union and non-union—be 
implemented in retail?  What lessons can be learned from efforts to purge discrimination 
in testing and screening elsewhere?  What are the options for adapting “family-friendly” 
schedule policies to the retail setting? 
 Using cross-national comparative research to understand the likely impact of various 
policy options, and assist in policy design.  We have referred repeatedly to our own US-
European comparative work in this paper and the role that varied institutions play in job 
quality.  Different comparisons yield different lessons.  At least in some cases, policies 
from France, with weak unions but a strong regulatory approach, may be easier to 
implement than policies from Northern European countries with high levels of union 
density and relatively centralized bargaining.  On the other hand, Denmark’s “flex-
security” system that combines a strong safety net with a high level of flexibility and job 
mobility, can offer important insights for what will work in high-flexibility, high-
mobility US workplaces.  Also, European retail industries remind us of the role of 
product market regulations in impacting job quality and these warrant further exploration 
in the US context. 
 Strengthening our understanding of mobility to, from, and through retail jobs.  While we 
have a good snapshot of retail job quality and strategies that shape it, we know less about 
typical mobility patterns.  Mobility opportunities are critical to the long-range prospects 
of workers in retail and other predominantly low-wage industries.  Longitudinal research 
can help to build up our knowledge of channels and barriers to mobility in these 
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sectors—and how collective action and policy changes could widen channels and lift 
barriers.  Such research could build on quantitative data, qualitative data such as in-depth 
interviews, or combine the strength of both. 
 
In closing, the rising dominance of retail by a handful of giant corporations presents a bad 
news/good news situation in terms of retail jobs.  The bad news is that industry-wide low-price 
competition predicted on paring back compensation and squeezing more effort and “flexibility” 
from the workforce unambiguously undermines job quality.  The good news is that industry 
consolidation creates a new set of leverage points on which carefully targeted policy and 
organizing can potentially exert extremely broad impacts.  Continued research and 
experimentation to locate and act on these leverage points holds out the promise of turning the 
industry that is America’s bad job leader into an example of how to convert bad jobs into good 
ones. 
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Appendix 
Table 1: Pay tables for four representative grocery chains 
 Mid-market-Southeast High end-Southeast Union-Midwest Warehouse (urban) 
Part-time     
Part-time bagger $5.75 (starting) $6.40-9.40* $6.20-6.70 $7.10-7.90 
Part-time cashier $6.00-7.25 $6.60-10.70* $7.30-12.90 $8.70-15.90 
Part-time grocery/dairy ~$7.00 (starting) $6.90-11.00* $7.30-14.00 $8.70-15.90 
Part-time produce  $6.90-11.00* $7.30-14.00 $8.70-15.90 
Full-time     
Cashier  $6.60-10.70* $12.70-20.80 $8.70-18.90 
Grocery/dairy  $8.00-12.00 $7.90-12.70* $12.70 $8.70-18.90 
Produce  $7.90-12.70* $12.70 $8.70-18.90 
Deli/bakery $10.00 $7.90-12.70* $15.10-20.80  
Meat cutter (journeyman) $15 + overtime $10.10-16.80* $22.30  
Supervisor     
Part-time supervisor    $9.50-16.70 
Grocery/dairy supervisor  $11.40-19.30 + bonus $21.90 $9.60-19.80 
Grocery manager  $12.20-20.10 + bonus (0-50%) $21.90 $10.00-$20.20 
Produce department manager $17.50  $12.20-20.10 + bonus $21.90 $10.00 
Meat department manager  $12.80-21.30 + bonus $23.00 $10.00 
Manager     
Assistant manager 
$18.50 + bonus (8%) 
(intermediate position betw. 
Asst. mger and mger.)  $22.30 $22.70-30.50 
Manager  $47 + bonus (0-50%) $49.50 + bonus (0-37.5%) $28.40-40.00 
  
*All hourly workers received 6.7% 
bonus.   
Note: Annual salaries for managers, including some department managers, were converted to hourly wages by dividing by 2000.  This overestimates their hourly 
rate, since managers typically work considerably more than 40 hours per week.  Information for first chain is from one store only; the others are from standard 
wage and salary scales, with the exception of a few positions.  For each chain, wage ranges are bottom and top for a single region. 
 
 
39 
Table 2: Pay tables at two representative consumer electronics chains 
 Electronics chain  Office supply  
Part-time   
Part-time cashier $5.15-10.00 (start)* $6.50-9.60 + bonus 
Part-time sales Up to $9-11* $7.00-10.50 + bonus (2%) 
Part-time high-end sales Up to $16*  
Full-time   
Cashier $10*  
Regular sales Up to $16-18* $15.28 (top) + bonus (5%) 
Repair technician $18*  
High-end sales $19*  
Supervisors   
Front end supervisor $15 (start) + bonus $12.40 + bonus (6%) 
Office equipment supervisor  $13.63 + bonus (17%) 
Copy center supervisor  15.75 + bonus (25%) 
Supervisor, sales $17, up to $26 + bonus  
Repair tech supervisor $18.50 + bonus  
Managers   
Assistant manager 
$17.50-31.50 + bonus (10-
50%) $17.50 (starting) 
Manager 
$30.00-48.00 + bonus (10-
50%) 
$32.50 average, $44.50 top + 
bonus (0-40%) 
*All hourly employees at the electronics chain get a bonus of 1-3%.   
Note: Annual salaries were converted to hourly rates by dividing by 2000, which overestimates the hourly rate 
because managers work more than 40 hours.  Some wages and bonuses were reported by individuals; others are 
company-level estimates. 
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